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RECONCILING THE IRRECONCILABLE CONFLICT IN
INSURANCE SEVERABILITY OF INTERESTS CLAUSE
INTERPRETATION
JOHNNY PARKER*
***
This article explores the inconsistency with which courts interpret
severability of interest clauses in insurance policy exclusions. The article
explores the severability of interest clauses and discusses the rules that
courts employ to interpret such clauses. Specifically, the article outlines
three methodologies of contract interpretation used by courts when faced
with severability of interest clause controversies and each method’s
strengths and weakness. The article concludes that behind the different
interpretive methods lie two schools of thought amongst the courts, those
who follow a “traditional or formalist” approach and those who follow a
“functional or reasonable expectations” approach.
***
I.

INTRODUCTION

Typically, a policy of insurance affords coverage to multiple
insureds – those being the named insured, as well as individuals considered
to be insureds as a result of their relationship with the named insured.
When one or more, but fewer than all, of the insureds being sued actually
engaged in conduct excluded from coverage in the policy, a controversy
can ensue as to whether an exclusion from coverage, which is clearly
applicable to one insured, operates to preclude all insureds – including
innocent co-insureds – from coverage under the policy. This issue is
further complicated by the inclusion in the policy of a severability of
interests clause, which typically provides that the insurance applies
separately to each insured.1 Innocent co-insureds may argue that such a
*Professor of Law, Tulsa University Law School. B.A., University of
Mississippi, 1982; J.D., University of Mississippi Law School, 1984; LL.M.,
Columbia University Law School, 1987.
1
The severability of interest clause was first included in insurance policies in
1955, when the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters and the Mutual Rating
Bureau revised the standard provisions and included the clause as a new condition.
The provision was designed to correct prior judicial interpretations which
construed the term “the insured” to preclude coverage to all insureds when any coinsured was excluded from coverage in the policy. Subsequent revision of the
language used in the severability of interest clause sought to express this purpose
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severability of interests clause overrides any exclusion to coverage as
applied individually to them.
In practical terms, a dispute over a severability of interests clause
involves an innocent co-insured who is sued in conjunction with, and as a
consequence of, a culpable insured’s conduct. The insurance company,
upon receipt of a notice of claim from the innocent co-insured, denies
coverage under the policy on the basis that because the conduct of a
culpable insured is expressly excluded, the claim of the innocent co-insured
is similarly excluded from coverage. The innocent co-insured takes the
position that regardless of the excluded conduct of another insured, she is
nevertheless entitled to coverage because of the presence of a severability
of interests clause in the policy.
Severability clause disputes can arise from a myriad of factual
situations. For example, in Co-Operative Ins. Co. v. Bennett,2 Michael
Jacques allegedly kidnapped his twelve-year-old niece, Brooke Bennett,
and transported her to his home in Randolph, Vermont where he “drugged,
sexually assaulted, and murdered her.”3 At that time, Michael was married
to Denise Woodward, who lived with him in the Randolph house. Denise
was not involved in the kidnapping or subsequent events. Nevertheless,
Brooke’s estate and father sued Denise for having “negligently failed to:
(1) supervise minor children while they were in the home, (2) warn the
Bennett family of the dangers posed by her husband, and (3) prevent the
harm from occurring.”4
Both Michael and Denise were named insureds on a homeowners’
policy issued by Cooperative Insurance Company (“Cooperative”). Denise
tendered the claim to Cooperative, which filed a declaratory judgment
action against Denise and plaintiffs in the underlying tort action on the
grounds that its homeowners’ policy excluded from coverage “bodily
injury” or “property damage”: “(1) which is expected by, directed by, or
intended by an ‘insured’; (2) that is the result of a criminal act of an
‘insured’; or (3) that is the result of an intentional or malicious act by or at
the direction of an ‘insured.’”5 The policy also provided that each insured
“is a separate ‘insured,’ but this does not increase ‘our’ limit.”6
The issues in Cooperative were whether a severability clause
creates an ambiguity when read together with an intentional acts exclusion
and whether such ambiguity must be resolved in favor of coverage.
even more clearly. Norman E. Risjord & June M. Austin, “Who Is ‘The Insured’”
Revisited, 28 INS. COUNS. J. 100, 100–101 (1961).
2
No. 168-8-10 Oecv, 2011 Vt. Super. LEXIS 35 (Apr. 11, 2011), aff’d sum
nom. Co-Operative Ins. Cos. v. Woodward, 2012 VT 22 (2012).
3
Co-Operative Ins. Cos., 2011 Vt. Super. LEXIS 35, at * 3.
4
Id. at *4.
5
Id. at *5.
6
Id. at *6.
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Defendants—Denise Woodward, along with Brooke Bennett’s estate and
father—argued that the severability clause created an expectation that the
intentional acts exclusion would be applied separately to each insured and
that this expectation created an ambiguity when compared with the
language of the exclusion.
According to the court, a severability clause does not create an
ambiguity in an otherwise clear and unambiguous exclusion for three
reasons. First, even though a severability clause may mean that the
insurance policy applies separately to each insured, it does not change the
fact that the policy contains an exclusion.7 Consequently, the severability
clause “cannot create coverage where none exists.”8 In other words, “the
act of applying the policy separately to each insured does not alter or create
ambiguity in the substance or sweep of the exclusion.”9 Second, the
majority of jurisdictions had adopted the view that “a severability clause
does not alter the collective application of an exclusion for intentional,
criminal, or fraudulent acts by ‘an’ or ‘any’ insured.”10
Co-Operative Ins. Co. v. Bennett represents one factual extreme heinous harm to person - on the severability dispute spectrum. The
opposite end of the factual spectrum - juvenile vandalism to property - is
illustrated by Chacon v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company.11
Chacon arose out of the vandalism of an elementary school by the
Chacons’ ten-year-old son Nicholas and another boy.12 The vandalism
caused damage in excess of $6,000.13 The school district’s insurer paid for
the damage and filed suit against the Chacons for reimbursement.14 Prior to
this lawsuit, the Chacons filed a claim relating to the damage caused by
Nicholas under their homeowners’ policy provided by American Family.15
The Chacons were the named insureds in the policy, which defined
“insured” to include “your relatives if residents of your household. . . . [or]
any other person under the age of 21 in your care or in the care of your
resident relatives.”16 The policy further provided that “each person
described above is a separate insured under this policy.”17 It also contained
a severability clause, which stated “this insurance applies separately to each
7

See id. at *17.
Co-Operative Ins. Cos., 2011 Vt. Super. LEXIS 35, at *17.
9
Id. at *19 (quoting SECURA Supreme Ins. Co. v. M.S.M., 755 N.W.2d 320,
329 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008).
10
Id. at *17–18 (quoting Minkler v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 232 P.3d 612, 623
(Cal. 2010)).
11
788 P.2d 748 (Colo. 1990).
12
Id. at 749.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id. at 750.
17
Id.
8
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insured. This condition will not increase our limit of liability for any one
occurrence.”18
The Chacons’ claim, since it resulted from the actions of their son,
was within the scope of coverage provided by the policy. Nicholas was
also an additional insured under the policy as a minor in their care.
American Family, however, argued that coverage was excluded by the
intentional acts exclusion which provided that personal liability coverage
does “not apply to bodily injury or property damage . . . which is expected
or intended by any insured.”19
According to American Family, the exclusion clearly and
unambiguously excluded coverage to all insureds when any individual
insured caused property damage that was “expected or intended.” The
Chacons asserted that American Family’s position failed to give effect to
the severability clause contained in the policy. They argued that the clause
created separate insured status for each insured, which required that the
exclusion be applied independently to each.
Under the guise of ascertaining the intentions of the parties, the
Court engaged in an objective evaluation of what a reasonable person
would have understood the contract to mean.20 The purported advantage of
this approach was that it considered and gave effect to all the policy
provisions and recognized that an insurance policy is a contract between
the parties, which should be enforced in a manner consistent with the
intentions expressed therein.21 Pursuant to this reasoning, the Court
concluded that an exclusion containing the term “any insured” clearly and
unambiguously expressed an intent to deny coverage to all insureds when
damage was intended or expected as a result of the actions of any one of
them.22
Between these two factual extremes lie a myriad of cases involving
every type of insurance policy and factual circumstances imaginable. This
article examines the impact of a severability of interests clause on
insurance policy exclusions. Its objective is to ascertain and explain the
reasoning that makes this area of insurance law seemingly irreconcilable.
Section I introduces the severability of interests clause. It uses several
factual situations to illustrate and provide a context for severability clause
disputes. Section II discusses the rules of insurance contract interpretation.
It explores how these rules are employed in the context of severability
clause disputes. Section II demonstrates that in the context of severability
disputes the rules of contract interpretation are applied in ways which
support the recognition of several distinct interpretive methodologies.
18

Id.
Id.
20
See id. at 752.
21
Id.
22
Id.
19
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Section III discusses the interpretive methodologies from the perspective of
two competing theories of contract interpretation. Section III explains the
strengths and weakness of the various methodologies in the context of these
theories. Section IV concludes that the severability of interests clause
interpretative landscape has been shaped by two diametrically opposite
judicial philosophies, the traditional approach and the functional approach.
I argue that the perception that severability clause jurisprudence is
irreconcilable is misplaced and that reconciliation in this subject area can
be achieved by adherence to the functional or reasonable expectation
approach to contract interpretation.
II.

SEVERABILITY CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE

Severability clause jurisprudence has evolved on a variety of
fronts. The first is the basic principles used by courts to interpret insurance
contracts. All courts agree that the primary objective of insurance policy
interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intentions of the
parties.23 Except in cases of ambiguity, this process typically begins with
the language of the policy.24 In this context, the words are to be accorded
their plain and ordinary meaning and usage,25 as ascertained from a
standard English dictionary.26 Where possible, an insurance policy should
be interpreted in a manner which gives reasonable meaning to all of its
provisions.27 Courts, in ascertaining the intention of the parties, are at
liberty to consider the intent and purpose of both the exclusion and
23

See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Hooks, 853 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ill. App. Ct.
2006); T.B. v. Dobson, 868 N.E.2d 831, 836 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007); American
Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Corrigan, 697 N.W.2d 108, 111 (Iowa 2005); Brumley v.
Lee, 963 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Kan. 1998); K.M.R. v. Foremost Ins. Grp., 171 S.W.3d
751, 753 (Ky. Ct. App. 2005); Pa. Nat’l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Bierman, 292 A.2d
674, 677 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1972); Travelers Ins. Co. v. American Cas. Co. of
Reading, Pa., 441 P.2d 177, 180 (Mont. 1968); Erdo v. Torcon Constr. Co., 645
A.2d 806, 808 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div., 1994); Madison Constr Co. v.
Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 735 A.2d 100, 106 (Pa. 1999).
24
See Chacon, 788 P.2d at 750; Hooks, 853 N.E.2d at 5; K.M.R. v. Foremost
Ins. Grp., 171 S.W.3d 751, 753 (Ky. Ct. App. 2005); Erdo, 645 A.2d 806 at 808.
25
See Essex Ins. Co. v. City of Bakersfield, 154 Cal. App. 4th 696, 7 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2007); Farmland Indus. v. Republic Ins. Co., 941 S.W.2d 505, 508 (Mo.
1997).
26
See Farmland Indus, 941 S.W.2d at 508; R.T. Vanderbilt Co. v. Continental
Cas. Co., 870 A.2d 1048, 1059 (Conn. 2005).
27
See Cicciarella v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 66 F.3d 764, 767 (5th Cir. 1995);
Amer. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. White, 65 P.3d 449, 454 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003);
Valero v. Florida Ins. Guar. Ass’n, Inc., 59 So.3d 1166, 1169 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App.2011); Hooks, 853 N.E.2d at 5; Dobson, 868 N.E.2d at 836; Benton v. Canal
Ins. Co., 130 So.2d 840, 846 (Miss. 1961).
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severability clause in the context of the type of policy at issue.
Furthermore, in cases of first impression, courts may also be guided in their
reasoning by precedents from other jurisdictions.
When an insurer proffers a policy exclusion as a basis for denying
coverage, it asserts an affirmative defense for which it has the burden of
proof.28 To prevail, the insurer must prove that the language of the
insurance policy is clear and unambiguous.29 Otherwise, the provision
should be construed in favor of coverage.30
Application of these rules in the context of severability clause
disputes has resulted in three distinct interpretive methods. These
interpretive methods share only one common thread. That being that each,
in drastically different ways, purports to enforce the intention of the parties
to the contract in the context of exclusions couched in terms of “an
insured” or “any insured.” The differences between the interpretative
methodologies are reflected in whether the terms “an insured” and “any
insured” are viewed as synonymous or distinct and whether the presence of
a severability clause modifies or creates an ambiguity in the exclusion.
While the insurance industry’s preference has been to refer to
excluded conduct from the perspective of “an” or “any” insured, some
insurance companies use different and more specific language to describe
what is excluded from coverage. For example, in Ristine v. Hartford
Insurance Co., Barbara Ristine and her minor daughter, L., sued David and
Carol Purcell, alleging that David had sexually molested L. on repeated
occasions while she spent the night at their home. 31 The complaint alleged
that Carol was negligent in failing to disclose to the plaintiffs that David
was a convicted child molester and in allowing him to be alone with L.32
The Purcells notified their homeowners’ insurance carrier – The
Hartford – of the claim and requested a defense. The Hartford refused the
tender on the basis of a policy exclusion excepting from bodily injury or
property coverage any claims “[a]rising out of sexual molestation, corporal
punishment or physical or mental abuse.”33 The Ristines ultimately settled
28

See First Specialty Ins. Corp., Inc. v. Flowers, 644 S.E.2d 453, 455 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2007); Lucas v. Deville, 385 So.2d 804, 819 (La. Ct. App. 1980); Thommes
v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 622 N.W.2d 155, 880 (Minn. 2001); Flomerfelt v.
Cardiello, 997 A.2d 991, 1004 (N.J. 2010); Madison Constr. Co. v. Harleysville
Mut. Ins. Co., 735 A.2d 100, 106 (Pa. 1999); American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Purdy, 483 N.W.2d 197, 199 (S.D. 1992).
29
See Madison Constr. Co. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 735 A.2d 100, 106
(Pa. 1999); Cicciarella, 66 F.3d at 767 (proposing that language is ambiguous
when its meaning is uncertain and doubtful or when it is reasonably susceptible of
more than one meaning).
30
See Cicciarella, 66 F.3d at 768.
31
97 P. 3d 1206, 1207 (Or. Ct. App. 2004).
32
Id.
33
Id.
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their lawsuit against Carol Purcell. As a part of the settlement, Carol
assigned to them her rights against The Hartford.
The Hartford asserted that the exclusion was unambiguous and that
when compared to other exclusions, in policies using the terms “an
insured” or “the insured,” the language in the policy manifested an intent to
exclude all claims arising out of sexual molestation, regardless of who
committed the acts.34 In other words, the exclusion was specifically
designed to identify and exclude a particular act, as contrasted with
exclusions that identify and exclude on the basis of the actor by using terms
such as – “the insured,” “an insured” or “any insured.” Therefore, all
claims arising out of the specified act – sexual molestation – were
precluded, without regards to the identity of the actor.
The court agreed with the Hartford that the absence of terminology
– such as “the insured,” “an insured,” or “any insured” – identifying an
actor demonstrated that the insurer intended to base the exclusion on the
nature of the act, rather than on the identity of the actor.35 Consequently,
even though the severability clause made the provisions of the policy
separately applicable to David and Carol, it did not affect the sexual
molestation exclusion because it contained no qualifications relative to the
identity of the actor.36
The impact of a severability clause on an exclusion depends on the
interpretive methodology used by the court. For example, in some
jurisdictions the terms “an insured” and “any insured” are viewed as
synonymous and are not modified by the presence of a severability clause.
Thus, all insureds are precluded from coverage because of the excluded
conduct of any one insured. I will refer to this as “Methodology No. 1.”
However, in other jurisdictions which also treat the terms as synonymous,
the principle of ambiguity is applied to achieve coverage in light of the
inclusion of a severability clause. This approach will be referred to as
“Methodology No. 2.” A number of jurisdictions reject the conclusion that
the terms “an insured” and “any insured” are synonymous when used in an
exclusion. Some jurisdictions that follow this view consider the former
phrase to be modified by a severability clause while the latter is not
(“Methodology No. 3a”). Others reach the same result by construing the
phrase “an insured” as ambiguous when read in conjunction with a
severability clause while “any insured” is unaffected (“Methodology No.
3b”).

34

Id. at 1209.
See id.
36
Id.
35
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A. METHODOLOGY NO. 1
Under this methodology, courts construe an insurance policy
exclusion that is couched in the words “an insured” or “any insured” to
apply to all the insureds and additionally hold that a severability clause has
no impact on that exclusion. This conclusion results when courts accord
greater weight to the precise language – “an insured” or “any insured” – of
the exclusion.37 Courts following this approach sometimes rule that an
absurd or repugnant interpretation should not result from construing the
policy to give effect to the severability clause.38 Under this line of
thinking, an absurd or repugnant result would occur when the application
of the severability clause would convert the policy purchased into a
different type which the insured neither negotiated nor paid for or would
otherwise enlarge the obligation originally undertaken by the insurer and
permit a windfall to the insured.39
The dominant rationale for this approach is that the purpose of the
severability clause is to spread protection to the limits of coverage, among
all insureds, not to negate bargained-for exclusions.40 Consequently, a
collective effect, pursuant to which the excluded act of one insured
precludes coverage for all, is accorded the exclusion if it is “specific” or
imposes a joint obligation on the insureds.41 Some courts construe the use
of the terms “an insured” or “any insured” as unambiguously creating a
37

See, e.g., Johnson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 687 A.2d 642, 644 (Me. 1997);
K.M.R. v. Foremost Ins. Grp., 171 S.W.3d 751 (Ky. Ct. App. 2005); Nat’l Ins.
Underwriters v. Lexington Flying Club, Inc., 603 S.W.2d 490 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979);
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto., 522 S.W.2d 184 (Ky. Ct. App.
1975); Gorzen v. Westfield Ins. Co., 526 N.W.2d 43 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994); Home
Owners Ins. Co. v. Selfridge, No. 280112, LEXIS 2504 (Mich. Ct. App. December
18, 2008), McAllister v. Millville Mut. Ins. Co., 640 A.2d 1283 (Pa. Super. 1994):
Caroff v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Washington, 261 P.3d 159, 163 (Wash.App. Div.
11999); Co-Operative Ins. Cos. v. Bennett, No. 168-8-10 Oecv, April 11, 2011 Vt.
Super. LEXIS 35.
38
See Oaks v. Dupuy, 653 So.2d 165 (La. Ct. App. 1995); Shelter Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Haller, 793 S.W.2d 391 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); B.P. Am., Inc. v. State Auto.
Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 148 P.3d 832 (Okla. 2005); Transit Cas. Co. v. Hartman’s
Inc., 239 S.E.2d 894 (Va. 1978).
39
See B.P. Am., Inc. 148 P.3d at 837–39; Transit Cas. Co. 239 S.E.2d at 897.
40
See Northwest G.F. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Norgard, 518 N.W.2d 179 (N.D. 1994);
Caroff v. Farmers Ins. Co., 261 P.3d 159 (Wash. App. Div. 1 1999).
41
See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kim, 121 F. Supp. 2d 1301 (D. Haw. 2010); Villa v.
Short, 947 A.2d 1217 (N.J. 2008); Northwest G.F. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Norgard, 518
N.W.2d 179 (N.D. 1994); McAllister v. Millville Mut. Ins. Co., 640 A.2d 1283
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1994); Great Cent. Ins. Co. v. Roemmich, 291 N.W.2d 772 (S.D.
1980); Caroff v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Washington, 261 P.3d 159 (Wash.App. Div. 1
1999).
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specific exclusion imposing a joint obligation.42 Apart from this rule,
courts otherwise have not articulated what makes an exclusion “specific” as
opposed to “general.”
This interpretive model was employed in the often cited case of BP
Am., Inc. v. State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Company. BP involved a
construction contract between B.P. America, Inc. (“BP”) and Doyal W.
Rowland Construction, Inc. (“Rowland”). As required under a construction
contract, BP obtained $1,000,000 in comprehensive general liability
coverage from State Auto and Casualty Company (“Insurer”). Insurer
issued two policies, listing Rowland as the named insured and BP as an
additional insured. The first policy covered general liability and the second
covered automotive liability. While the policies were in force, a multi-car
accident occurred involving a dump truck driven by a Rowland employee.
Three people died and a fourth sustained serious injuries. Multiple lawsuits
were filed. In different combinations, the suits named as defendants the
employee, Rowland, BP, and/or Insurer. The personal injury lawsuits
settled with Insurer contributing $1,000,000 pursuant to the automotive
liability policy. Thereafter, BP filed suit in federal court seeking recovery
under the general liability policy. Recognizing that the lawsuit involved
issues of first impression, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Oklahoma certified two questions to the Oklahoma Supreme
Court:
1. “[w]hether, under Oklahoma Law, the term ‘any
insured’ in an ‘Auto Exclusion’ clause of a commercial
general liability policy excludes from coverage all
automobile occurrences attributable to any of the
insureds?” [and]
2. “[w]hether, under Oklahoma Law, the inclusion of both
an ‘Auto Exclusion’ clause and a ‘separation of insureds’
clause in a commercial general liability policy creates an
ambiguity in the contract?”43
The Court answered the first certified question in the affirmative.
Influenced by the “overwhelming number of courts” which had addressed
the issue, the Court concluded that the use of the term “any insured” in an
exclusion unambiguously expressed a definite intent to deny coverage to all
insureds.44 According to the Court, insurers are not required to provide
coverage in the absence of premium payments – as was the case – except
42

See Allstate Ins. Co., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1301; Villa, 947 A.2d 1217;
Northwest G.F. Mut. Ins. Co., 518 N.W.2d 179; McAllister, 640 A.2d 1283; Great
Cent. Ins. Co., 291 N.W.2d 772; Caroff, 261 P.3d 159
43
B.P. Am., Inc., 148 P.3d at 833.
44
Id. at 836.
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where public policy demands.45 Furthermore, a contrary interpretation
would “convert a general liability policy—without [automotive]
coverage—into an automotive liability policy.”46 The Court further found
support for its answer to question one in Oklahoma precedents which
construed the phrase “an insured,” as used in an exclusion, to preclude
coverage to all insureds.47 In the process, the Court read “an insured” and
“any insured” as synonymous.
With respect to the second issue, the insureds argued that, even if
the exclusion was clear when read in isolation, the presence of a
severability clause in the commercial policy created an ambiguity. That
clause provided:
Except with respect to the Limits of Insurance, and any
rights or duties specifically assigned in this Coverage Part
to the first Named Insured, this insurance applies:
a. As if each Named Insured were the only Named
Insured; and
b. Separately as to each insured against whom claim is
made or ‘suit’ is brought.48
Insurer contended, however, that to ignore the term “any insured” in the
exclusion would be to render an otherwise unambiguous policy provision
meaningless.
The Court reasoned that the clear intent of the parties was to
preclude coverage for all insureds whenever an exclusion was applicable to
“any insured.” This intent was reflected not only in the exclusion’s use of
the phrase “any insured,” but also by the fact that the parties negotiated for
two different policies providing distinct coverages.49
Courts which rely on this interpretive method to conclude that a
severability clause has no impact on the collective effect of an exclusion
employing the phrase “an insured” or “any insured” typically view the
phrases as synonymous.50 The phrases are viewed as manifesting the intent
of the parties to make coverage for all insureds contingent on the actions of
45

Id. at 837–38.
Id. at 839.
47
See Phillips v. Estate of Greenfield, 859 P.2d 1101, 1103 (Okla. 1993)
(explaining a homeowner’s policy in clear and unambiguous language excludes
coverage where an injury arises out of the use of a motor vehicle owned or
operated by an insured).
48
B.P. Am., Inc., 148 P.3d at 839.
49
Id.
50
Villa v. Short, 947 A.2d 1217, 1223 (N.J. 2008); B.P. Am. Inc., 148 P.3d at
839; McAllister v. Millville Mut. Ins. Co., 640 A.2d 1283, 1288 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1994).
46

2013

INSURANCE SEVERABILITY OF INTEREST CLAUSE

71

any one insured.51 These courts also overwhelmingly reject the argument
that the language of the severability clause – “this insurance applies. . .
[s]eparately as to each insured against whom claim was made”—creates an
ambiguity when read in conjunction with exclusions employing either
phrase.
Rejection of the ambiguity argument is typically based on one or a
combination of two rationales. The first is that the severability clause is
located in a different part of the policy from exclusions.52 Consequently,
the insured’s sole expectation is for equal coverage.53 The second rationale
is that the use of the indefinite article “an” or “any” before insured in an
exclusion clearly signals that the parties understood and intended that the
exclusion would be applied collectively to bar all insureds from coverage.54
This interpretive method while not novel, is misguided because it
ignores the reality that ambiguity in an insurance policy can arise from
sources other than ambiguous language, such as inconsistent policy
provisions, poor policy organization and inconsistent judicial
interpretation.55 It is also predicated on a legal fiction that a single rule of
insurance contract interpretation – language used in a single provision – is
dispositive of the intention of the parties. The focus of this line of
reasoning is not whether the inclusion of a severability clause is
inconsistent with a blanket exclusion, but “whether the contract indicates
that the parties intended such a result.”56 The latter formulation allows
courts to ignore the language and fundamental purpose of the severability
clause. This method is strict in its reliance on a single consideration –
language of the exclusion – and harsh in that it places the entire risk of loss
on the insured. The most glaring flaw however, is that it provides no
incentives for insurance companies to engage in better policy drafting.
B. METHODOLOGY NO. 2
The second interpretive method stands in stark contradiction to the
first. It holds that while the terms “an insured” or “any insured” are
synonymous, the presence of a severability clause in the policy renders the
exclusion ambiguous. This ambiguity derives from the conclusion that the
51

See, e.g., Caroff v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 261 P.3d 159, 161 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1999).
52
See, e.g., Villa, 947 A.2d at 1224.
53
Id. at 1225.
54
Id. at 1223.
55
See Johnny Parker, The Wacky World of Collision and Comprehensive
Coverages: Intentional Injury and Illegal Activity Exclusions, 79 NEB. L. REV. 75,
101–06 (2000) (stating that ambiguity can arise from inconsistent policy
provisions, policy organizations, or ambiguous language).
56
Chacon v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 788 P.2d 748, 752 (Colo. Sup. Ct.
1990).
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language of the severability clause creates a reasonable expectation that
each insured will be separately covered, while the exclusion purports to
preclude coverage for all as a result of the excluded act of one. This
approach gives meaning and effect to both the severability clause and the
exclusion because the culpable insured is excluded from coverage while the
innocent co-insured’s right to a defense and indemnification is determined
separately.
This interpretive model views an exclusion and a severability
clause as competing provisions. Where such is the case, the exclusion and
the severability clause should be construed to require that the exclusion be
applied only against culpable insureds for whom coverage is sought.57 In
other words, the clear language of a severability clause dictates that
“coverage as to each insured must be determined separately based on the
facts applicable to each such insured.”58
Under this approach, because a severability clause renders a policy
exclusion ambiguous,59 the term used in the exclusion does not alter this
consequence. As observed in Brumley v. Lee:
The words “an” and “any” are inherently indefinite and
ambiguous. The two words can and often do have the
same meaning. The Random House Dictionary of the
English Language 68 (1973) gives many definitions for the
word “any.” The first definition listed is “one, a, an, or
some.” Correspondingly, the Random House Dictionary
includes the word “any” among its definitions for the word
“a” or “an.” Hence, the words may have the same
meaning. Thus, the word “any” is not materially different
from the word “a” or “an,” and, contrary to the district
court’s ruling, Safeco’s use of “any” instead of “an” in its
policy does not eliminate the ambiguity created by the
policy’s severability clause.60
According to this interpretive model, this rule applies without regard to the
type of policy, exclusion or language used therein.61
A severability clause, therefore, requires that the policy exclusions
be interpreted with respect to the facts and circumstances specific to the

57

See, e.g., Brumley v. Lee, 963 P.2d 1224, 1227 (Kan. 1998); Am. Nat’l Fire
Ins. Co. v. Estate of Fournelle, 472 N.W.2d 292, 294 (Minn. 1991).
58
Rose Constr. Co. Inc. v. Gravatt, 642 P.2d 569, 571 (Kan. 1982).
59
Brumley, 963 P.2d at 1228.
60
Id. at 1227–28.
61
See, e.g., Rose Constr. Co., 642 P.2d 569 (noting that a severability clause
modified an exclusion in an automobile policy using the term “an insured”).
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individual insured seeking coverage.62 For example, in American National
Fire Insurance Co. v. Fournelle, the Court entertained the issue of whether
a household exclusion in a homeowners’ insurance policy containing a
severability clause excluded coverage where the named insured killed his
two children.63
In Fournelle, Robert Fournelle and his wife, Joanne Fournelle,
separated on January 16, 1985. Robert left the marital residence, while
Joanne Fournelle remained in the house with the couple’s two sons. After
filing for divorce on January 25, 1985, she received temporary custody of
the children and temporary possession of the house. Thereafter, Robert
lived separate and apart from Joanne and the children.
On March 3, 1985, Robert arrived at the marital residence to visit
his sons. He shot and killed the boys, vandalized the house, and then
committed suicide. Joanne filed a wrongful death
lawsuit against
Robert’s estate. The estate tendered the defense of the suit to American
National pursuant to the Fournelles’ homeowners’ policy on the marital
residence.
The American National homeowners’ policy listed both Robert and
Joanne as named insureds. The deceased children were not named
insureds. The policy’s household exclusion provided that coverage “does
not apply to: f. bodily injury to you and any insured within the meaning of
part a. or b. of Definition 3.”64 Throughout the policy the terms “you” and
“your” referred to the named insureds – here, Robert and Joanne.
Definition 3, parts a. and b. stated that: “3. ‘insured’ means you and the
following residents of your household: a. your relatives; b. any other person
under the age of 21 who is in the care of any person named above.”65 The
policy also contained a severability clause.
American National argued that the severability clause was
immaterial because the exclusion, by its expressed language, applied to
“any insured.” Therefore, since the children resided with Joanne – an
insured – at the time of their death, they qualified as insureds under the
policy as “person[s] under the age of 21 . . . in the care of [a named
insured].” The estate countered that the severability clause required that
the exclusion be read solely in reference to Robert because he was the only
62

Compare Secura Supreme Ins. Co. v. M.S.M., 755 N.W.2d 320, 324–25
(Minn. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that a juvenile’s attack on a neighbor fell within
the meaning of “criminal acts” as used in the policy exclusion regardless of the
juvenile’s intent), with Slavens v. Am. Fire & Cas. Co., No. C7-00-1070, 2001
Minn. App. LEXIS 94, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2001) (finding that an the
intent of the policy was “to exclude coverage when someone who qualifies as ‘an
insured’ under the policy commits an act of sexual molestation – regardless of
whether that person is involved in the day care business”).
63
472 N.W.2d 292, 293 (Minn. 1991).
64
Id.
65
Id.
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insured seeking coverage under the policy.
According to the Court, American National’s position was
inconsistent with both the policy language and the doctrine of severability.
Finding the policy’s language ambiguous,66 the Court observed that:
Severability is a widely recognized doctrine that
acknowledges the separate and distinct obligations the
insurer undertakes to the various insureds, named and
unnamed. The intent of a severability clause is to provide
each insured with separate coverage, as if each were
separately insured with a distinct policy, subject to the
liability limits of the policy. Thus, severability demands
that policy exclusions be construed only with reference to
the particular insured seeking coverage.67
The Court surmised that the insurer must have inserted the
severability clause in the policy for some purpose. Furthermore, a
reasonable interpretation of the words “this insurance applies separately to
each insured” leads to but one conclusion: that each insured must be treated
as if he or she was insured separately, applying exclusions individually as
to the insured for whom coverage is sought.68 “There would be no point to
a severability clause if it did not provide separately to each named
insured.”69 Any other conclusion would render the severability clause
meaningless.70
This methodology was also employed by the court in Hilmer v.
White.71 In Hilmer, Benjamin White, then seventeen-years-old, pled guilty
to the attempted murder of Casey Hilmer. Benjamin had grabbed the
thirteen-year-old Casey while she was jogging, dragged her into the woods,
and stabbed her repeatedly in the side and neck.
Casey and her parents sued Benjamin as well as his parents, Lance
and Diane White. In the civil suit, the Hilmers claimed that Lance and
Diane had been negligent in that they failed to properly supervise their son
and entrusted him with a dangerous instrument. The jury returned a verdict
for compensatory damages in the amount of $6.5 million. The jury further
determined that Lance and Diane were responsible for seventy percent of
that amount.
At the time of the attack, the Whites had two homeowners’
66

Id. at 294.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
68
Id. at 294.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
No. C-070074, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 6288 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 28,
2007).
67
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insurance policies and two umbrella policies. One of the homeowners’
policies was issued by defendant – appellee Federal Insurance Company
(“Federal”). One of the umbrella policies was issued by defendant –
appellee Pacific Indemnity Company (“Pacific”). The remaining policies
were issued by plaintiff – appellant Safeco Insurance Company (“Safeco”).
Shortly after the Hilmers filed their lawsuit, Safeco filed a
declaratory judgment action claiming that it owed no duty to defend or
indemnify the Whites. Safeco also requested that the trial court determine
the priority of coverage between the two policies that it had issued and the
two issued by Federal and Pacific. The trial court concluded that the
intentional tort exclusions in the Safeco policies were ambiguous because
of the severability clause present in each policy. The court also held that
Safeco owed coverage on a pro-rata basis with the other two insurance
companies. Safeco appealed.
Lance and Diane White were named insureds in the Safeco
homeowners’ policy. The term “insured” also included relatives who
resided in the household. The policy excluded coverage for bodily injury
“which is expected or intended by an insured or which is the reasonably
foreseeable result of an act or omission intended by an insured.”72 Bodily
injury “arising out of an illegal act committed by or at the direction of an
insured” was also excluded.73
Safeco’s umbrella policy named Lance White as an insured. As in
the homeowners’ policy, the term “insured” included any member of the
household.74 It excluded from coverage “any injury caused by a violation
of penal law or ordinance committed by or with the knowledge or consent
of any insured”75 as well as “any act or damage which is expected or
intended by any insured, or which is the foreseeable result of an act or
omission intended by any insured . . . .”76 Both the homeowners’ policy
and the umbrella policy contained a severability provision stating that
“[t]his insurance applies separately to each insured . . . .”77 The appellate
court affirmed the trial court and concluded that Safeco’s use of the terms
“an insured” and “any insured” in its homeowners’ and umbrella policies,
respectively, caused the exclusions to be ambiguous when read in
conjunction with the severability clause found in each.78
72

Id. at *8 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at *8–9.
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Id. at *9.
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Id. at *11–12; see also Ill. Union Ins. Co. v. Shefchuk, 108 Fed. App’x 294
(6th Cir. 2002). The court’s conclusion in Hilmer has not, however, been
consistently followed by other lower courts in Ohio. See United Ohio Ins. Co. v.
Metzger, No. 12-98-1, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 920 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 8, 1999).
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This interpretive method is predicated on the maxims that an
insurance policy must be read as a whole and, that ambiguity in an
insurance contract can arise from inconsistent policy provisions79 as was
the case in Fournelle and Hilmer, or from ambiguous language as in
Brumley. As demonstrated by Hilmer, the determination that an ambiguity
exists as a consequence of inconsistent policy provisions requires little
more than an examination of the entire policy and application of the rule of
contra proferentem. That is, ambiguity will be construed against the
drafter and in favor of coverage.
C. METHODOLOGY NO. 3
This interpretive method is the most complex and perplexing of
any used to resolve severability clause disputes. While the focus of the
inquiry remains the intention of the parties, courts using this approach do
not treat “an” or “any” as synonymous. Consequently, these courts reach a
different result regarding the effect of a severability clause depending on
whether an exclusion refers to the conduct of “an” or “any” insured.80
1. Methodology No. 3a
In light of a policy’s severability clause, exclusions referring to the
conduct of “an” insured have been distinguished from those using the
phrase “any” insured and construed to apply separately to each insured
such that one insured’s excluded activity does not preclude coverage for
other insureds who did not participate in the excluded activity.81 For
example, in United Services Automotive Association v. DeValencia,82 an
Arizona appellate court found itself confronted with determining a
among the state appellate courts regarding the issue of whether a severability
clause renders an exclusion using the term “an insured” ambiguous. See Safeco
Ins. Co. of Am. v. White, 913 N.E.2d 426 (Ohio 2009).
79
See Parker, supra note 55.
80
Compare Nw. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Nemetz, 400 N.W.2d 33, 38 (Wis. Ct. App.
1986) (concluding that the “contract [was] ambiguous because the severability
clause create[d] a reasonable expectation that each insured’s interests [were]
separately covered, while the exclusion clause attempt[ed] to exclude coverage for
both cause by the act of [an insured]), with Taryn E.F. v. Joshua M.C., 505 N.W.2d
418, 422 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (finding that “the term ‘any insured’ unambiguously
precludes coverage to all persons covered by the policy if any one of them engages
in excludable conduct”), and Nationwide Mut. v. Mazur, CV 980489231S, 1999
Conn. Super. LEXIS 1533 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 3, 1999) (finding that a “policy’s
specific use of the words, ‘each’ and ‘an,’ as opposed to the determiner ‘any,’
demonstrates an intent to provide coverage to the insureds separately”).
81
See, e.g., Litz v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 695 A.2d 566 (Md. 1997).
82
949 P.2d 525 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997).

2013

INSURANCE SEVERABILITY OF INTEREST CLAUSE

77

severability clause’s effect on an exclusion from the perspective of a novel
factual situation. Therein, Dennis and Debra Gerow provided day care in
their home to three minor children of the appellants, the DeValencias.
After discovering that their children had been molested by the Gerow’s
fourteen-year-old son CG, the DeValencias asserted negligent supervision
and breach of contract claims against the Gerows.
The Gerows’ homeowners’ insurer – USAA – filed an action for
declaratory judgment in response to the DeValencias’ lawsuit, asserting
that its policy did not cover their claim. The trial court granted USAA’s
motion for summary judgment, concluding that there was no coverage
under the policy because the business pursuit exclusion precluded liability
coverage for acts and omissions “arising out of or in connection with a
business engaged in by an insured.”83 The parties agreed that this
exclusion was applicable to CG’s parents – the Gerows. The DeValencias,
however, argued that it was not applicable to CG because of the policy’s
severability clause, which provided “[t]his insurance applies separately to
each insured. This condition will not increase our limit of liability for any
one occurrence.”84
The court concluded that because the exclusion referred to the acts
of “an insured,” applicability of the exclusion should be determined
separately as to each insured. Thus, “to bring CG’s acts within the business
pursuit exclusion, USAA was obliged to show that he was individually
engaged in a business pursuit when he committed the alleged acts.”85
The court’s reasoning and holding in DeValencia were
subsequently clarified in Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. White.86 Therein,
Travis Wilde hit Bryan White in the head with a metal pipe. Travis pled
guilty to aggravated assault. White later sued Travis and his parents (“the
Wildes”), who filed a claim with their insurance carrier, American Family.
American Family filed a declaratory judgment action asserting that all the
claims by all insureds were precluded under the “violation of law”
exclusion contained in the Wildes’ homeowners’ policy: “Violation of
Law. We will not cover bodily injury or property damage arising out of . . .
violation of any criminal law for which any insured is convicted . . . .”87
According to the Wildes, because American Family’s policy
contained a severability of insurance clause identical to that in DeValencia,
DeValencia was controlling, and the applicability of the exclusion had to
be determined separately as to each insured. Therefore, because only
83

Id. at 527 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
85
Id.
86
65 P.3d 449 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003).
87
Id. at 452. The policy also contained an “Intentional Injury” exclusion,
which like the violation of law exclusion, used the term “any insured.” Id. at 453
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Travis was convicted of violating a criminal law, the claims against them
remained covered under the policy.88
The court rejected this argument and distinguished the
exclusionary clause in DeValencia from that in the American Family policy
purchased by the Wildes. “The exclusionary clause in DeValencia applied
to ‘acts or omissions ‘arising out of or in connection with a business
engaged in by an insured.’”89 The exclusion at issue in the case at hand
applied to “violation of any criminal law for which any insured is
convicted.”90 While the parties agreed that “any” meant no more than “an,”
the court, which viewed the matter as a question of law, drew its own
conclusion. Deferring to the majority view, it concluded that the phrase
“any insured” in an applicable exclusion operates as a bar to coverage for
any claim of any insured, even if the policy contains a severability clause.91
DeValencia and White indirectly or implicitly held that the terms
“an insured” or “any insured” when used in an exclusion are neither
synonymous nor affected similarly by the presence of a severability clause
in the policy. However, in Nationwide Mut. v. Mazur,92 these questions
were addressed head on. In Mazur, Michael Mazur, a minor, lured Andrew
Christmas to a remote area where he assaulted and struck him with such
force as to render Andrew unconscious. Michael then proceeded to punch
and kick Andrew in the head while he lay helpless and unconscious on the
ground. Andrew and his father filed suit against Michael and his mother—
Judy Mazur – seeking to recover damages for injuries incurred by Andrew
as a result of the assault.
Judy filed a claim under her homeowners’ policy provided by
Nationwide Mutual (“Nationwide”).
Nationwide denied the claim,
asserting that it had no duty to defend or indemnify either Michael or Judy
because Michael’s acts were intentional and expressly excluded in the
policy. The relevant exclusion provided in part: “Coverage E Personal
Liability . . . [does] not apply to bodily injury . . . . a. caused intentionally
by or at the direction of an insured, including willful acts the result of
which the insured knows or ought to know will follow from the insured’s
conduct.”93 Judy contended that because the policy included a severability
clause, she, as a separate insured under the policy, was entitled to coverage
even if coverage was excluded for Michael.
The court agreed. It construed the inclusion of the severability
88

Id. at 456.
Id. (quoting United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. DeValencia, 949 P.2d 525, 527
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1997)).
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provision in the policy as recognition on the part of Nationwide that it
owed Judy a distinct and separate coverage obligation aside and apart from
any obligations it owed Michael. Consequently, whether Michael’s
conduct was excluded under the policy had no effect on Judy’s entitlement
to coverage.
Nationwide also argued that the term “an insured” was
synonymous with “any insured” in the intentional acts exclusion.94 The
court rejected this assertion and concluded, that the policy’s use of the term
“each” in the severability clause and “an” in the exclusion demonstrated an
intent to provide coverage to the insureds separately. Where the terms “an”
or “any” are viewed as distinct, the latter term is often construed to
unambiguously deny coverage to all insureds as the result of excluded
conduct by any of the persons insured by the policy.95 The presence of a
severability clause generally does not change this result.
In this method, the intent and purpose of the severability clause,
which is to limit the scope of the exclusion to the insured seeking coverage,
is construed in light of the language – “an insured” – as used in an
exclusion. Where the phrase “an insured” is construed as being modified
by a severability clause, a narrow construction of the exclusion is implied
from the presence of the severability clause in the policy. This means that
coverage consists of “what . . . the insured expected to receive and what the
insurer agreed to provide, as disclosed by the provisions of the policy . . .
.”96 This approach does not assume that an exclusion is per se ambiguous
merely because the policy contains a severability clause.97 Rather, the
exclusion is applied to each insured individually for purposes of
determining whether there is coverage. The end result is that both the
severability clause and the exclusion are given effect.98 The opposite result
occurs where the phrase “any insured” is used.
94

Id. at *27.
See Taryn E.F. v. Joshua M.C., 505 N.W.2d 418, 422 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993);
White, 65 P.3d 449; Chacon v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 788 P.2d 748 (Colo.
1990); Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Corrigan, 697 N.W.2d 108 (Iowa 2005); Am.
Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Copeland–Williams, 941 S.W.2d 625 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997);
Oaks v. Dupuy, 653 So. 2d 165 (La. Ct. App. 1995); but see, Am. Fam. Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Bower, 752 F. Supp. 2d 957, 971 (N.D. Ind. 2010) (explaining a severability
clause renders an exclusion referring to the conduct of any insured ambiguous); W.
Am. Ins. Co. v. AV&S, 145 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1998) (explaining a severability
clause renders an exclusion referring to the conduct of any insured ambiguous);
Worcester Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marnell, 496 N.E.2d 158 (Mass. 1986); Premier Ins.
Co. v. Adams, 632 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (noting the term “any
insured” modified by the presence of a severability clause).
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See Covenant Ins. Co. v. Sloat, No. 385786, 2003 Conn. Super. LEXIS
1557, at *20 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 23, 2003).
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See Mazur, 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1533, at *26–27.
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2. Methodology No. 3b
This methodology is a variant of the one just discussed. It differs
only in its reliance on the principle of ambiguity to achieve coverage. It is
discussed separately for two reasons. First, only a couple of state Supreme
Courts have used the principle of ambiguity to determine the impact of a
severability clause on an exclusion referring to the conduct of “an insured”
distinct from “any insured.” Second, it further demonstrates the general
negative treatment that the phrase “an insured,” when divorced from “any
insured,” has received throughout severability of interests clause
interpretation.99 The California Supreme Court’s Minkler v. Safeco Ins. Co.
100
decision is the most prominent example of this methodology. It
illustrates both propositions.
In Minkler, the California Supreme Court agreed to answer a
question of California insurance law directed to it by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The question asked was “[w]here a
contract of liability insurance covering multiple insureds contains a
severability-of-interest clause . . . , does an exclusion barring coverage for
injuries arising out of the intentional acts of ‘an insured’ bar coverage for
claims that one insured negligently failed to prevent the intentional acts of
another insured?”101 Minkler involved a lawsuit filed by Scott Minkler
against David Schwartz and his mother Betty Schwartz. Scott alleged that
David, an adult, had sexually molested him when he was a minor. Some of
these acts allegedly occurred in Betty’s home and as a result of her
negligent supervision.
Betty was the named insured under a series of policies issued by
Safeco Insurance Company (“Safeco”). David was an additional insured in
each policy. The policies provided liability coverage to an insured for
personal injury or property damages arising out of a covered occurrence.
They excluded from coverage any injury that was “expected or intended by
an insured or which [was] the foreseeable result of an act or omission
intended by an insured . . . .”102 The policy also contained a severability of
interest provision which provided that “[t]his insurance applies separately
to each insured.”103 The ultimate question before the Court was whether
Betty “was barred from coverage only if her own conduct in relation to
David’s molestation of Scott fell within the policies’ exclusion for

99

See Wilson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 540 So. 2d 749 (Ala.
1989)(illustrating how exclusion is ambiguous even in the absence of a severability
clause).
100
232 P.3d 612 (Cal. 2010).
101
Id. at 616.
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Id. at 615.
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intentional acts.”104
The Minkler Court expressly noted the split of authority
surrounding the issue of the impact of a severability clause on a policy
exclusion referring to the acts of “an” or “any” insured.105 It also
recognized that California law, in the absence of contrary evidence, viewed
exclusions from coverage described in reference to the acts of “an” or
“any,” as opposed to “the,” collectively, so that if one insured committed
an excluded act, all insureds were barred from coverage.106 Nevertheless,
the Court concluded that, “an exclusion of coverage for the intentional acts
of ‘an insured,’ read in conjunction with a severability or ‘separate
insurance’ clause like the one at issue . . . creates an ambiguity which must
be construed in favor of coverage that a lay policyholder would reasonably
expect.”107
Minkler has several noteworthy aspects. First, the Court’s
reasoning – which focused on the language of both the severability clause
and the exclusion, in light of the reasonable expectation of the insured – is
concise and consistent with the rules of insurance contract interpretation.
Second, the holding of the court is supported in part by the general, rather
than specific, nature of the exclusion. In other words, the use of the term
‘an’ is insignificant and does not cause an exclusion to be specific in
nature. Third, the Court cautioned that its reasoning and holding under the
specific circumstances of the case did not mean that a severability clause
necessarily affects all exclusions framed in terms of “an” or “any”
insured.108 This cautionary note manifests judicial awareness of the factsensitive nature of insurance policy interpretation. In this context, it
reflects sensitivity to situations where application of a severability clause
would render an absurd result such as converting the policy purchased into
a type of policy which was neither negotiated nor paid for.109
Courts employing Methodology 3a and 3b, respectively are
exercising a policy choice in favor of coverage in limited situations. That
choice is reflected in the restricted application of the functional theory of
contract interpretation to this methodology. The problem, however, is that
the functional approach is neither fully nor consistently applied. For
example, in the context of the term “an insured,” the philosophy of the
reasonable expectation of a lay insured has been fully integrated. However,
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Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Haller, 793 S.W.2d 391 (Mo. App. 1990).
105

82

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 20.1

when the exclusion is couched as “any insured,” the outcome reflects the
functional theory of contract interpretation.
III.

RECONCILING THE INTERPRETIVE METHODOLOGIES

While the ultimate legal conclusion reached in a particular case is
frequently dictated by individual circumstances, the legal reasoning used
by the court is often less transparent. Nevertheless, there is a method to the
madness. The interpretive methodologies used to resolve severability
disputes indicate that courts are applying principles of contract
interpretation in a manner that reflects two competing approaches: (1) the
“traditional” or “formalist” approach; (2) the “functional” or “reasonable
expectation” approach.110 These approaches differ in that the “traditional”
110

See Collins v. Farmers Ins. Co., 822 P.2d 1146, 1159 (Or. 1991) (Unis, J.,
dissenting). Justice Unis, dissenting, explained the similarities and distinctions
between these interpretive approaches:
Under the “traditional” or “formalist” approach, the court looks
to the “four corners” of the insurance policy and interprets it by
applying rules applicable to all contracts in general. The insured
is held to have read and to have understood the clear language of
the policy. Extrinsic evidence relating to the insurance contract
may be examined for the purpose of determining the parties’
intention to an objective analysis of the “four corners” of the
contract. . . . The rationale behind the “formalist” approach is
that contracts of insurance rest upon and are controlled by the
same principles of law that apply to other contracts, and the
parties to an insurance contract may provide such provisions as
they deem proper as long as the contract does not contravene law
or public policy (citations omitted). . . . The competing approach
to insurance contract interpretation—the “functional” or
“reasonable expectation” approach – is that the policyholder’s
reasonable expectations to coverage under the insurance policy
should be honored even though those expectations vary from the
policy provisions. . . . The “functional” or “reasonable
expectation” approach is supported by the notion that insurance
contracts are not ordinary contracts negotiated by parties with
roughly equal bargaining strength. Rather, they are largely
contracts of adhesion, where the insurance company, in
preparing a standardized printed form, has the superior
bargaining position, and the insured has to accept such a policy
on a “take-it-or-leave-it” basis if the insured wants any form of
insurance protection. . . . Restatement (Second) of Contracts, §
211 (1981), “[r]epudiates the ‘four-corners’ [‘traditional’ or
‘formalist’] approach to contract interpretation in the
standardized agreement setting and in effect approves a doctrine
of ‘reasonable expectations.’” . . . A growing number of courts
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theory is logically based and precedent-oriented, whereas the “functional”
theory is sociologically-based and result-oriented.111
According to the “traditional” or “formalist” approach, correct
legal decisions are determined by pre-existing legal precedent. Courts
reach their decisions by logical deduction which results from applying the
facts of a case to a set of pre-existing legal rules. The “traditional”
approach is premised entirely on the theory that the law is a science
consisting of socially-neutral, logical principles and rules.112 Pursuant to
the “traditional” or “formalist” approach, a severability clause ordinarily
will not negate an exclusion unless: (1) the policy is ambiguous; (2) the
exclusion is masked by technical or obscure language; or (3) the exclusion
is hidden in the policy provisions.113
The “functional” or “reasonable expectation” approach posits “that
the paramount concern of the law should not be logical consistency . . . but
socially desirable consequences.”114 The “functional” approach looks into
the future and considers “[w]hat substantive goals, derived from popular
wants and interests, are relevant? What rules or other precepts are required
to further them?”115 Thus, the “functional” approach supports a finding of
coverage “if (1) the insurer knew or should have known of the insured’s
expectation; (2) the insurer created or helped to create those expectations;
or (3) the insured’s expectations are objectively reasonable in light of the
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Id. at 1159–61 (citations omitted).
111
Peter Nash Swisher, Judicial Rationales in Insurance Law: Dusting Off the
Formal for the Function, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037, 1042 (1991).
112
Id. at 1040–41. The formalist approach has been described as:
It is not the duty of our courts to be leaders in reform … The
judge is always confined within the narrow limits of reasonable
interpretation. It is not his function or within his power to
enlarge or improve the law [since that is the function of the
legislature]. His duty is to maintain it, to enforce it, whether it is
good or bad, wise or foolish . . . .
id. at 1042 (quoting Elihu Root, The Importance of an Independent Judicary, 72
THE INDEPENDENT 704 (1912)).
113
Johnny Parker, The Wacky World of Collision and Comprehensive
Coverages: Intentional Injury and Illegal Activity Exclusion, 79 NEB. L. REV. 75,
110 (2000).
114
Swisher, supra note 105, at 1043.
115
Id.

84

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 20.1

circumstances and facts of the case.”116 “There is no disagreement between
the “formalist” and the “functional” approaches whenever the insurance
policy is ambiguous or susceptible to two or more reasonable
interpretations.”117
The traditional or formalist118 articulates the objective of contract
interpretation as ascertaining the intention of the parties and, thereafter,
inquires as to whether any rational support favoring application of the
exclusion exists. Such support is often gleaned from the language of the
exclusion to the extent that it can be described as specific (as opposed to
general in nature), unambiguous or imposing a joint obligation. The
formalistic approach is strict in its adherence to precedents and harsh in
that it favors the insurer’s interpretation of the policy. This approach also
reflects a paternalistic interest in protecting an industry from the
consequences of its own ill-advised drafting.
The overarching principle of contract interpretation is to ascertain
and give effect to the intention of the parties. While the interpretation of
insurance contracts is guided by this principle, it is controlled by somewhat
different standards because an insurance contract is often one of adhesion,
particularly in personal lines. Adhesion contracts provide insureds with
little choice beyond electing among standardized provisions offered to
them on a take it or leave it basis. Furthermore, many insureds cannot view
their policy language until after tendering payment.119 Consequently, under
the functional approach, insurance policies are construed to provide
coverage which a layperson would reasonably expect, given a lay
interpretation of the policy language.120 This construction offsets the
greater bargaining position of insurance companies and prevents the use of
insurance policies as a wholesale method of controlling applicable law.121
In contrast, the formalist approach ignores the fact that insurance contracts
are contracts of adhesion, typically written to afford greater protection to
the insurer.
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The functional approach to severability clause interpretation is
reflected in every interpretive methodology which holds that a severability
of interests provision modifies an exclusion referring to the conduct of ‘an’
or ‘any’ insured. 122 However, the functional approach has only been fully
incorporated into Methodology No. 2, thus, making it the most insurance
consumer oriented. Methodology No. 2 is superior to Methodologies 3a
and 3b because it recognizes that an insurance contract is one of adhesion
and shifts the entire risk of loss to the drafting party by giving effect to the
severability clause regardless of the language used to describe the excluded
conduct. Methodologies 3a and 3b use the functional approach to shift the
burden of loss to the drafting party by giving effect to the severability
clause exclusively in the context of exclusions referring to the conduct of
“an insured.” Both 3a and 3b use the traditional theory of contract
interpretation when an exclusion refers to the conduct of “any insured.”
Methodology No. 1 is the least favorable to insurance consumers because it
relies solely on the traditional theory of contract interpretation, pursuant to
which the adhesive nature of insurance contracts is insignificant.
The functional approach considers the policy as a whole and
typically employs the principle of ambiguity or reasonable expectation of
the insured to construe the severability clause in favor of coverage or as
having severed application. The availability of clearer language and
alternative provisions are relevant considerations in the context of the
functional approach to insurance contract interpretation. The functional
approach has become firmly entrenched in insurance law jurisprudence
over the past four decades.123
The functional approach, unlike its “traditional” counterpart,
promotes fairness in policy interpretation by avoiding the recognition of a
per se rule of coverage or non-coverage. Rather, the exclusion, in light of
the presence of the severability clause, is applied to each insured
separately. It also promotes and encourages careful drafting. For if it is
122
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asked, “why do insurance companies include severability clauses in
insurance contracts?,” the “functional” answer is that a severability clause
objectively conveys the impression of coverage. It appears to be the
virtually unanimous opinion of the legal scholars writing on the subject that
the purpose of the addition of the severability clause was to provide
coverage.124 Otherwise, the clause is unnecessary.
The problems associated with severability clause interpretation
could easily be resolved by employing language which clearly alerts
insureds to the absence of coverage. The functional approach imposes such
an obligation on insurers. Where insurers fulfill this obligation, their
interpretation of the exclusion should be adopted.
For example, in Northwest G. F. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Norgard,125 the
insurer used language specifically designed to avoid a severability clause
dispute. In Norgard, Ray and Jean Norgard purchased a homeowners’
policy from Northwest G. F. Mut. Insurance Company (“Northwest”). Jean
operated a home day care business for which she purchased additional
insurance coverage from Northwest. Under the day care endorsement,
Northwest provided coverage for “bodily injury and property damage
arising out of home day care services regularly provided by an insured and
for which an insured receives monetary or other compensation.”126 It
excluded coverage for “bodily injury or property damage arising out of
sexual molestation, corporal punishment or physical or mental abuse
inflicted upon any person by or at the direction of an insured, an insured’s
employee or any other person involved in any capacity in the day care
enterprise . . . .”127 Ray was the named insured and all relatives residing in
the Norgard household were also insured under the homeowners’ policy.
Ray Norgard was accused and convicted of engaging in sexual
contact with L.A.A., the Andersons’ four-year-old daughter, while the child
was under Jean’s supervision at day care. The Andersons brought a civil
action against both Ray and Jean, accusing the latter of negligence in the
supervision and care of the child. The Norgards tendered the claim to
Northwest.
Northwest filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to establish
that it was not obligated to defend or indemnify either Ray or Jean because
the injuries arose out of Ray’s sexual molestation, which was specifically
excluded from coverage. While the parties agreed that Ray was
disqualified from coverage under the sexual molestation exclusion, they
disagreed as to whether Jean was entitled to coverage. The Norgards
argued that she was because of the severability provision, which provided
124
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that “this insurance applies separately to each insured . . . .”128
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the district court
judge found that the severability clause and the sexual molestation
exclusion, when read together, were ambiguous, thus warranting
construction in favor of coverage. Northwest appealed.
On appeal, the Court reversed, holding that the severability clause
precluded coverage to Jean. The Court based its conclusion on the unique
language of the exclusion, which pertained to the conduct of not only “an
insured” but also “an insured’s employee or any other person involved in
any capacity in the day care enterprise . . . .” This language manifested the
clear intent of the parties to preclude coverage when any person connected
with the operation of the day care engaged in sexual molestation of one of
the children. The language clearly and specifically provided that these
risks were outside the scope of the policy.129
Where the language of the exclusion is particularly tailored to
except from coverage specific acts of specific individuals, it should prevail
over a more general provision such as the severability clause. Similarly,
the absence of any reference to a specific actor – “an insured” or “any
insured” – in an exclusion demonstrates that the parties intended to base the
exclusion on the nature of the act, rather than on the identity of the actor.130
In either instance, the severability clause is subordinate to the exclusion.131
Severability disputes could also be avoided by replacing the
severability clause with a joint obligation clause in the policy. The latter
provides: The terms of this policy impose joint obligations on persons
defined as an insured person. This means that responsibilities, acts and
failures to act of a person defined as an insured person will be binding upon
another person defined as an insured person.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The conflict that exists in the law of severability clause
interpretation is primarily a consequence of misguided adherence to and
use of the traditional or formalistic theory of contract interpretation. This
theory has no place in modern day insurance contract interpretation. This
proposition is illustrated by the court’s analysis in Maryland Casualty
Company v. American Fidelity & Casualty Company.132 There, a federal
district court was called upon to predict how the Tennessee Supreme Court
128

Id. at 181.
Id. at 183.
130
See, e.g., Ristine v. Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest, 97 P.3d 1206, 1209
(Or. Ct. App. 2004).
131
See, e.g., Nw. G.F. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Norgard, 518 N.W.2d 179, 183 (N.D.
1994); Ristine v. Hartford Ins. Co., 97 P.3d 1206, 1210 (Or. Ct. App. 2004).
132
217 F. Supp. 688 (E.D. Tenn. 1963).
129

88

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 20.1

would resolve the question of whether a severability clause affected an
employee exclusion contained in an automobile liability policy. The court
found both the exclusion and the severability clause to be ambiguous
because the language used was susceptible to two reasonable
interpretations.133 Ambiguity was also evidenced by the fact that various
courts had arrived at conflicting conclusions as to the meaning of both
clauses.134
Despite its finding of ambiguity, which should have been resolved
in favor of the non-drafting party, the court proceeded to a consideration of
prevailing precedents. In that context, the court, despite its express
disagreement with the soundness of the conclusions reached, felt
constrained to hold that any employee of “the insured” meant any
employee of any insured. In Maryland Cas., use of the traditional theory of
contract interpretation resulted in a restrictive construction of the
severability clause which, though acknowledged by the court to be
unsound, was nevertheless condoned (possibly because the court felt
constrained as a federal court sitting in diversity).
Rigid adherence to the traditional theory of contract interpretation
limits the legal system’s ability to deal with some of the most problematic
and frequently litigated questions of insurance coverage. It unduly limits
the analysis of the meaning and function of insurance contracts. For these
reasons severability of interests clause interpretation remains the “only
known situation where many of the courts persist in erring in favor of the
insurance companies!”135
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